# ICS Advisory (ICSMA-19-022-01)
## Drager Infinity Delta
Original release date: January 22, 2019
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### Legal Notice
All information products included in [https://us-cert.gov/ics](/ics) are
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* * *
## 1\. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
* **CVSS v3 8.4**
* **ATTENTION:** Low skill level to exploit
* **Vendor:** Drager
* **Equipment:** Infinity Delta
* **Vulnerabilities:** Improper Input Validation, Information Exposure Through Log Files, Improper Privilege Management
## 2\. RISK EVALUATION
Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could cause information
disclosure of device logs, denial of service through device reboots of the
patient monitors, and privilege escalation.
## 3\. TECHNICAL DETAILS
### 3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS
The following versions of Drager patient monitoring medical devices are
affected:
* Infinity Delta, all versions,
* Delta XL, all versions,
* Kappa, all version, and
* Infinity Explorer C700, all versions.
### 3.2 VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW
**3.2.1 [IMPROPER INPUT VALIDATION
CWE-20](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html)**
A malformed network packet may cause the monitor to reboot. By repeatedly
sending the malformed network packet, an attacker may be able to disrupt
patient monitoring by causing the monitor to repeatedly reboot until it falls
back to default configuration and loses network connectivity.
[CVE-2018-19010](http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2018-19010)
has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of 6.5 has been
calculated; the CVSS vector string is
([AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H)).
**3.2.2 [INFORMATION EXPOSURE THROUGH LOG FILES
CWE-532](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/532.html)**
Log files are accessible over an unauthenticated network connection. By
accessing the log files, an attacker is able to gain insights about internals
of the patient monitor, the location of the monitor, and wired network
configuration.
[CVE-2018-19014](http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2018-19014)
has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of 4.3 has been
calculated; the CVSS vector string is
([AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N)).
**3.2.3 [IMPROPER PRIVILEGE MANAGEMENT
CWE-269](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/269.html)**
Via a specific dialog it is possible to break out of the kiosk mode and reach
the underlying operating system. By breaking out of the kiosk mode, an
attacker is able to take control of the operating system.
[CVE-2018-19012](http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2018-19012)
has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of 8.4 has been
calculated; the CVSS vector string is
([AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)).
### 3.3 BACKGROUND
* **CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS:** Healthcare and Public Health
* **COUNTRIES/AREAS DEPLOYED:** Worldwide
* **COMPANY HEADQUARTERS LOCATION:** Germany
### 3.4 RESEARCHER
Marc Ruef and Rocco Gagliardi, of scip AG, reported these vulnerabilities to
NCCIC.
## 4\. MITIGATIONS
Drager released fixes for these vulnerabilitiesin December 2018. Users can
find Delta/Infinity Explorer VF10.1 software releases for affected components
via Drager ServiceConnect.
Drager further advises:
* Users are advised to review their network segmentation configuration. The Drager Infinity-Network is supposed to be either logically or physically separate from the hospital LAN.
* Users are advised to review the Windows patch level of their Infinity Explorer. The Infinity Explorer software is verified by Drager on a monthly basis to be compatible to all latest operating system patches by Microsoft. Users can get the test report via their local sales representative.
Users can direct further questions related to the vulnerabilities to a
designated regional marketing manager. For reporting incidents and potential
vulnerabilities in Drager devices, please refer to
<https://static.draeger.com/security> to contact the Product Security team
directly.
For more information on these vulnerabilities and associated software updates,
please see Drager product security advisory 201802 at:
<https://static.draeger.com/security>
NCCIC recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of
exploitation of this vulnerability. Specifically, users should:
* Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, and ensure that they are [not accessible from the Internet](/ics/alerts/ICS-ALERT-10-301-01).
* Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls, and isolate them from the business network.
* When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing that VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize that VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.
NCCIC reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk
assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
NCCIC also provides a section for [control systems security recommended
practices](/ics/content/recommended-practices) on the ICS-CERT web page.
Several recommended practices are available for reading and download,
including [Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-
Depth Strategies](/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-
CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf).
Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly
available on the [ICS-CERT website](/ics/) in the Technical Information Paper,
[ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation
Strategies](/ics/tips/ICS-TIP-12-146-01B).
Organizations observing any suspected malicious activity should follow their
established internal procedures and report their findings to NCCIC for
tracking and correlation against other incidents.
No known public exploits specifically target these vulnerabilities. These
vulnerabilities are not exploitable remotely.
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