WAGO Industrial Managed Switches 852-303, 852-1305, and 852-1505

# ICS Advisory (ICSA-19-164-02) ## WAGO Industrial Managed Switches 852-303, 852-1305, and 852-1505 Original release date: June 13, 2019 [Print Document](javascript:window.print\(\);) [Tweet](https://twitter.com/share?url=https%3A%2F%2Fus- cert.cisa.gov%2Fics%2Fadvisories%2FICSA-19-164-02) [Like Me](https://www.facebook.com/sharer.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Fus- cert.cisa.gov%2Fics%2Fadvisories%2FICSA-19-164-02) [Share](http://www.addthis.com/bookmark.php?url=https%3A%2F%2Fus- cert.cisa.gov%2Fics%2Fadvisories%2FICSA-19-164-02) ### Legal Notice All information products included in [https://us-cert.gov/ics](/ics) are provided "as is" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within. DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service, referenced in this product or otherwise. Further dissemination of this product is governed by the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) marking in the header. For more information about TLP, see [https://www.us- cert.gov/tlp/](/tlp/). * * * ## 1\. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY * **CVSS v3 9.8** * **ATTENTION** : Exploitable remotely/low skill level to exploit * **Vendor** : WAGO * **Equipment** : Industrial Managed Switches 852-303, 852-1305, and 852-1505 * **Vulnerabilities** : Use of Hard-coded Credentials, Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key, Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities ## 2\. RISK EVALUATION Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow a compromise of the managed switch, resulting in disruption of communication, and root access to the operating system. ## 3\. TECHNICAL DETAILS ### 3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS WAGO reports these vulnerabilities affect the following industrial managed switches: * 852-303: All versions prior to v1.2.2.S0 * 852-1305: All versions prior to v1.1.6.S0 * 852-1505: All versions prior to v1.1.5.S0 ### 3.2 VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW **3.2.1 [USE OF HARD-CODED CREDENTIALS CWE-798](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)** An attacker with access to the hard-coded credentials may gain access to the operating system of the managed switch with root privileges, which may allow manipulation of the operating system of the managed switch. [CVE-2019-12550](http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2019-12550) has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of 9.8 has been assigned; the CVSS vector string is ([AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)). **3.2.2 [USE OF HARD-CODED CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY CWE-321](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/321.html)** An attacker with access to the hard-coded SSH key may disrupt communication or compromise the managed switch. The SSH-keys cannot be regenerated by users and all switches use the same key. [CVE-2019-12549](http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2019-12549) has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of 9.8 has been assigned; the CVSS vector string is ([AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)). **3.2.3 USING COMPONENTS WITH KNOWN VULNERABILITIES** The listed managed switches use outdated third-party components with known vulnerabilities. See the full list of CVE identifiers in CERT@VDE advisory number [VDE-2019-013](https://cert.vde.com/en-us/advisories/vde-2019-013). ### 3.3 BACKGROUND * **CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS:** Commercial Facilities * **COUNTRIES/AREAS DEPLOYED:** Worldwide * **COMPANY HEADQUARTERS LOCATION:** Germany ### 3.4 RESEARCHER T. Weber of SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab reported these vulnerabilities to CERT@VDE. ## 4\. MITIGATIONS WAGO recommends users update their managed switch to the latest firmware published June 7, 2019, or later. New firmware can be requested in the Runtime Software dropdown within the Downloads section at the links below: * 852-303: v1.2.2.S0 or later <https://www.wago.com/us/switches/industrial-managed-switch/p/852-303> * 852-1305: v1.1.6.S0 or later <https://www.wago.com/us/switches/industrial-managed-switch/p/852-1305> * 852-1505: v1.1.5.S0 or later <https://www.wago.com/us/switches/industrial-managed-switch/p/852-1505> WAGO also recommends users implement the following security measures: * Restrict network access to the switch * Restrict network access to the SSH server. * Do not directly connect the device to the Internet. For more information CERT@VDE has released a security notification which can be viewed at the following link: <https://cert.vde.com/en-us/advisories/vde-2019-013> NCCIC recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of these vulnerabilities. Specifically, users should: * Implement access control lists. * Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls, and isolate them from the business network. * When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing that VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize that VPN is only as secure as the connected devices. NCCIC reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures. NCCIC also provides a section for [control systems security recommended practices](/ics/content/recommended-practices) on the ICS-CERT web page. Several recommended practices are available for reading and download, including [Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in- Depth Strategies](/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS- CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf). Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the [ICS-CERT website](/ics/) in the Technical Information Paper, [ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies](/ics/tips/ICS-TIP-12-146-01B). Organizations observing any suspected malicious activity should follow their established internal procedures and report their findings to NCCIC for tracking and correlation against other incidents. No known public exploits specifically target these vulnerabilities.