Apache Spark 多个漏洞

### Reporting Security Issues Apache Spark uses the standard process outlined by the [Apache Security Team](https://www.apache.org/security/) for reporting vulnerabilities. Note that vulnerabilities should not be publicly disclosed until the project has responded. To report a possible security vulnerability, please email security@apache.org. This is a non-public list that will reach the Apache Security team, as well as the Spark PMC. ### Known Security Issues **CVE-2018-17190: Unsecured Apache Spark standalone executes user code** Severity: Low Vendor: The Apache Software Foundation Versions Affected: - All versions of Apache Spark Description: Spark’s standalone resource manager accepts code to execute on a ‘master’ host, that then runs that code on ‘worker’ hosts. The master itself does not, by design, execute user code. A specially-crafted request to the master can, however, cause the master to execute code too. Note that this does not affect standalone clusters with authentication enabled. While the master host typically has less outbound access to other resources than a worker, the execution of code on the master is nevertheless unexpected. Mitigation: Enable authentication on any Spark standalone cluster that is not otherwise secured from unwanted access, for example by network-level restrictions. Use spark.authenticate and related security properties described at https://spark.apache.org/docs/latest/security.html Credit: - Andre Protas, Apple Information Security **CVE-2018-11804: Apache Spark build/mvn runs zinc, and can expose information from build machines** Severity: Low Vendor: The Apache Software Foundation Versions Affected - 1.3.x release branch and later Description: Spark’s Apache Maven-based build includes a convenience script, ‘build/mvn’, that downloads and runs a zinc server to speed up compilation. This server will accept connections from external hosts by default. A specially-crafted request to the zinc server could cause it to reveal information in files readable to the developer account running the build. Note that this issue does not affect end users of Spark, only developers building Spark from source code. Mitigation: - Spark users are not affected, as zinc is only a part of the build process. - Spark developers may simply use a local Maven installation’s ‘mvn’ command to build, and avoid running build/mvn and zinc. - Spark developers building actively-developed branches (2.2.x, 2.3.x, 2.4.x, master) may update their branches to receive mitigations already patched onto the build/mvn script - Spark developers running zinc separately may include “-server 127.0.0.1” in its command line, and consider additional flags like “-idle-timeout 30m” to achieve similar mitigation. Credit: - Andre Protas, Apple Information Security **CVE-2018-11770: Apache Spark standalone master, Mesos REST APIs not controlled by authentication** Severity: Medium Vendor: The Apache Software Foundation Versions Affected: - Spark versions from 1.3.0, running standalone master with REST API enabled, or running Mesos master with cluster mode enabled Description: From version 1.3.0 onward, Spark’s standalone master exposes a REST API for job submission, in addition to the submission mechanism used by spark-submit. In standalone, the config property spark.authenticate.secret establishes a shared secret for authenticating requests to submit jobs via spark-submit. However, the REST API does not use this or any other authentication mechanism, and this is not adequately documented. In this case, a user would be able to run a driver program without authenticating, but not launch executors, using the REST API. This REST API is also used by Mesos, when set up to run in cluster mode (i.e., when also running MesosClusterDispatcher), for job submission. Future versions of Spark will improve documentation on these points, and prohibit setting spark.authenticate.secret when running the REST APIs, to make this clear. Future versions will also disable the REST API by default in the standalone master by changing the default value of spark.master.rest.enabled to false. Mitigation: For standalone masters, disable the REST API by setting spark.master.rest.enabled to false if it is unused, and/or ensure that all network access to the REST API (port 6066 by default) is restricted to hosts that are trusted to submit jobs. Mesos users can stop the MesosClusterDispatcher, though that will prevent them from running jobs in cluster mode. Alternatively, they can ensure access to the MesosRestSubmissionServer (port 7077 by default) is restricted to trusted hosts. Credit: - Imran Rashid, Cloudera - Fengwei Zhang, Alibaba Cloud Security Team **CVE-2018-8024: Apache Spark XSS vulnerability in UI** Severity: Medium Versions Affected: - Spark 2.1.0 through 2.1.2 - Spark 2.2.0 through 2.2.1 - Spark 2.3.0 Description: In Apache Spark 2.1.0 to 2.1.2, 2.2.0 to 2.2.1, and 2.3.0, it’s possible for a malicious user to construct a URL pointing to a Spark cluster’s UI’s job and stage info pages, and if a user can be tricked into accessing the URL, can be used to cause script to execute and expose information from the user’s view of the Spark UI. While some browsers like recent versions of Chrome and Safari are able to block this type of attack, current versions of Firefox (and possibly others) do not. Mitigation: - 2.1.x users should upgrade to 2.1.3 or newer - 2.2.x users should upgrade to 2.2.2 or newer - 2.3.x users should upgrade to 2.3.1 or newer Credit: - Spencer Gietzen, Rhino Security Labs **CVE-2018-1334: Apache Spark local privilege escalation vulnerability** Severity: High Vendor: The Apache Software Foundation Versions affected: - Spark versions through 2.1.2 - Spark 2.2.0 to 2.2.1 - Spark 2.3.0 Description: In Apache Spark up to and including 2.1.2, 2.2.0 to 2.2.1, and 2.3.0, when using PySpark or SparkR, it’s possible for a different local user to connect to the Spark application and impersonate the user running the Spark application. Mitigation: - 1.x, 2.0.x, and 2.1.x users should upgrade to 2.1.3 or newer - 2.2.x users should upgrade to 2.2.2 or newer - 2.3.x users should upgrade to 2.3.1 or newer - Otherwise, affected users should avoid using PySpark and SparkR in multi-user environments. Credit: - Nehmé Tohmé, Cloudera, Inc. **CVE-2017-12612 Unsafe deserialization in Apache Spark launcher API** JIRA: [SPARK-20922](https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SPARK-20922) Severity: Medium Vendor: The Apache Software Foundation Versions Affected: - Versions of Apache Spark from 1.6.0 until 2.1.1 Description: In Apache Spark 1.6.0 until 2.1.1, the launcher API performs unsafe deserialization of data received by its socket. This makes applications launched programmatically using the launcher API potentially vulnerable to arbitrary code execution by an attacker with access to any user account on the local machine. It does not affect apps run by spark-submit or spark-shell. The attacker would be able to execute code as the user that ran the Spark application. Users are encouraged to update to version 2.1.2, 2.2.0 or later. Mitigation: Update to Apache Spark 2.1.2, 2.2.0 or later. Credit: - Aditya Sharad, Semmle **CVE-2017-7678 Apache Spark XSS web UI MHTML vulnerability** JIRA: [SPARK-20393](https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SPARK-20393) Severity: Medium Vendor: The Apache Software Foundation Versions Affected: - Versions of Apache Spark before 2.1.2, 2.2.0 Description: It is possible for an attacker to take advantage of a user’s trust in the server to trick them into visiting a link that points to a shared Spark cluster and submits data including MHTML to the Spark master, or history server. This data, which could contain a script, would then be reflected back to the user and could be evaluated and executed by MS Windows-based clients. It is not an attack on Spark itself, but on the user, who may then execute the script inadvertently when viewing elements of the Spark web UIs. Mitigation: Update to Apache Spark 2.1.2, 2.2.0 or later. Example: Request: ``` GET /app/?appId=Content-Type:%20multipart/related;%20boundary=_AppScan%0d%0a-- _AppScan%0d%0aContent-Location:foo%0d%0aContent-Transfer- Encoding:base64%0d%0a%0d%0aPGh0bWw%2bPHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgiWFNTIik8L3NjcmlwdD48L2h0bWw%2b%0d%0a HTTP/1.1 ``` Excerpt from response: ``` <div class="row-fluid">No running application with ID Content-Type: multipart/related; boundary=_AppScan --_AppScan Content-Location:foo Content-Transfer-Encoding:base64 PGh0bWw+PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgiWFNTIik8L3NjcmlwdD48L2h0bWw+ </div> ``` Result: In the above payload the BASE64 data decodes as: ``` <html><script>alert("XSS")</script></html> ``` Credit: - Mike Kasper, Nicholas Marion - IBM z Systems Center for Secure Engineering